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When HTA is confidential and experts have no power: the 
case of Hungary  
 
Abstract 
Health technology assessment (HTA) is not simply a mechanistic technical exercise 
as it takes place within a specific institutional context. Yet, we know little about how 
this context influences the operation of HTA and its ability to influence policy and 
practice. We seek to demonstrate the importance of considering institutional 
context, using a case study of Hungary, a country that has pioneered HTA in Central 
and Eastern Europe. We conducted 26 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
public and private sector stakeholders. We found that while the HTA Department, 
the Hungarian HTA organisation, fulfilled its formal role envisaged in the legislation, 
its potential for supporting evidence-based decision-making was not fully realised 
given the low levels of transparency and stakeholder engagement. Further, the 
Department’s practical influence throughout the reimbursement process was 
perceived as being constrained by the payer and policymakers, as well as its own 
limited organisational capacity. There was also scepticism as to whether the current 
operational form of the HTA process delivered “good value for money”. 
Nevertheless, it still had a positive impact on the development of a broader 
institutional HTA infrastructure in Hungary. Our findings highlight the importance of 
considering institutional context in analysing the HTA function within health 
systems.   
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1. Introduction 
Health technology assessment (HTA) supports decision-makers in allocating scarce 
resources for expensive medical technologies, primarily pharmaceuticals (Banta 
2003; Henshall et al. 1997; Valesco-Garrido and Busse 2005). It offers particular 
opportunities in settings such as Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
(Mandrik et al. 2015) that face significant budgetary constraints and where sub-
optimal investment decisions bring substantial opportunity costs (Kolasa et al. 
2016). The potential benefits of HTA include more rational use of resources, 
improved patient outcomes resulting from greater use of evidence-based 
technologies (Schumacher and Zechmeister 2013; Zechmeister and Schumacher 
2012), and more generally, by contributing to a climate that values evidence in 
healthcare policy and practice (Oortwijn et al. 2008). Yet, these benefits may not 
always be achieved in practice. The few studies that have examined the institutional 
characteristics and context of HTA have reached conflicting conclusions (Fischer et 
al. 2013; Böhm et al. 2014) so any  effects of different institutional contexts on HTA 
processes are far from clear (Landwehr and Boehm 2011) and recommendations on 
best practices in HTA implementation are difficult to generalise (Kaló et al. 2016).  
 
Hungary was among the pioneers of HTA in Central and Eastern Europe (Löblová 
2016). In this paper, we examine the institutional arrangements within which HTA in 
Hungary takes place, its influence on decision-making, and how its benefits and 
costs are viewed by key stakeholders. While the precise arrangements that exist in 
Hungary are unique to the country, we offer this paper as an example of the 
importance of understanding the HTA function within a broader context, and in 
doing so, hope that it will provide lessons for other countries seeking to implement 
or strengthen their own HTA systems. 
 
The development of HTA in Hungary and its institutional basis have been described 
in detail elsewhere (Gulacsi et al., 2004; Boncz et al., 2006; Kaló et al., 2013; Gulácsi 
and Péntek, 2014). Moreover, there have been detailed studies of particular 
elements of the process, including the continuing development of methodological 
guidelines for economic evaluations (Szende et al. 2002; Gulácsi et al. 2014), the 
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application of multi-criteria decision-making in assessing technologies (Endrei et al. 
2014), and developing a critical appraisal checklist (Inotai et al. 2012). However, we 
still lack an adequate understanding of many aspects of how HTA and its process of 
making decisions on reimbursement actually operate, in part because of a lack of 
basic documentation in the public domain. Notably, while previous studies suggest 
the existence of informal rules and practices that may complement or circumvent 
the formal reimbursement process, these have not been subjected to in-depth 
scrutiny.  Consequently, we know very little about the role and influence of key 
stakeholders, including the public HTA body, in final reimbursement decisions. Nor 
has the existing literature sought to identify the benefits and costs associated with 
the existing model of HTA in Hungary. 
 
The aim of this paper is therefore threefold. First, to identify institutional 
characteristics of HTA that may either facilitate or constrain the decision-supporting 
role of the HTA Department. Second, to assess the influence of the HTA Department 
in relation to other key players engaged in the reimbursement process. Third, to 
determine whether various stakeholders consider the current HTA system to 
represent good “value for money” and how they perceive its costs and benefits.  
 
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the Hungarian reimbursement 
system. We then explain our methods. In the remainder of the paper we answer 
each of the three research questions in turn. We conclude that Hungarian HTA has 
faced challenges in adapting to changing circumstances and suggest reasons why 
this may be so.  
 
2. Overview of the current Hungarian reimbursement and HTA procedures 
Hungary established its own HTA Department, an organisation tasked with 
reviewing proposals for reimbursement of health technologies, in 2004. It had just 
acceded to the European Union (EU) and this was means of complying with the EU’s 
Transparency Directive (Gulácsi et al. 2009; Kolasa et al. 2012). Since its inception 
the HTA Department has moved among various organisational structures and 
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currently lies within the National Institute of Pharmacy and Nutrition (NIPN), a 
licensing authority for pharmaceutical and public administrational matters.  
The HTA department is part of a broader process of reimbursing new medical 
technologies. In line with Ministerial Decree No. 32/2004. (IV. 26.), any 
manufacturer seeking reimbursement of a new pharmaceutical or a price increase 
or new indication for one already on the market must submit a full HTA dossier. The 
most common “normal” reimbursement procedure starts with the submission of a 
reimbursement application to the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). The 
application is then passed to the HTA Department and the relevant College of 
Medical Professionals. These bodies are responsible for, respectively, conducting a 
critical appraisal of the submission, and providing an expert opinion on the 
technology. The reimbursement procedures are coordinated by the Department of 
Reimbursement (DR) at the NHIF, which also prepares a preliminary opinion on the 
submission.  
 
The critical appraisal document, the medical expert opinion, and the preliminary 
opinion of the DR are discussed by the Health Technology Assessment Committee 
(HTAC), based at NHIF. Approximately 10 people attend HTAC meetings but the 
precise mix may vary according to the technology being considered. There are 
usually 5-6 NHIF representatives, 2-3 medical professionals who are permanent 
members, representatives of the HTA Department and relevant advisors from the 
College of Medical Professionals. However, only NHIF representatives and the 
permanent medical professionals have voting rights. The HTAC makes a 
recommendation on reimbursement, either positive or negative, and decides the 
appropriate reimbursement scheme. The HTAC recommendation is reached by a 
simple majority vote among those with voting rights. Subsequently, the DR prepares 
a final recommendation for the Director-General of the NHIF. In some cases, the 
Director-General has the authority to make the final decision based on the 
recommendation of the DR. However, in many cases a positive reimbursement 
decision requires changes in the legislation for reimbursing health technologies 
(Annexes of the Ministerial Decree No. 32/2004) for instance where a new 
indication is added. In such cases, the Ministry of Human Capacities, a super-
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ministry that includes the State Secretary of Health and the Ministry of National 
Economy are involved in the decision-making process. 
 
3. Methods 
We applied a single case study approach (Yin 2003) using qualitative data from 26 
in-depth, semi-structured expert interviews with major stakeholders involved in 
HTA in Hungary. The interviews were conducted between August 2016 and January 
2017 in Budapest. We applied purposive sampling, aiming to include key categories 
of stakeholders involved in the HTA procedures in Hungary, namely the HTA 
Department, the NIPN, the NHIF, the Ministry responsible for health (i.e. Ministry of 
Human Capacities), academia, manufacturers, consultant companies, and patient 
organisations (Table 1). The interviews were carried out by Researcher A (in 
Hungarian, 13 interviews in total), Researcher B (in English, 7 interviews) and 
Researcher D (in Hungarian, 6 interviews in total). All the interviewers had been 
involved in the study from the outset and are experienced in HTA in Hungary. The 
vast majority of interviews were conducted in person; only 4 interviews took place 
via Skype. A typical interview lasted around one hour.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Potential interviewees were selected based on their current or previous 
institutional affiliations, their expert status evidenced by, for example, authoring 
scientific articles or participation in relevant conferences, or recommendations by 
other interviewees. The expert knowledge of our interviewees was also evidenced 
by their multiple prior affiliations. The interview guide was agreed on at the 
beginning of the fieldwork and comprised mainly broad open-ended questions. 
These questions asked the interviewees’ opinions on the following topics: 
 the most important benefits of HTA in Hungary 
 potential benefits which cannot be achieved with the current HTA system 
 key challenges facing the HTA process in Hungary 
 is the system being fit for its purpose? 
 transparency of procedures 
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 costs associated with HTA in Hungary 
Additionally, more detailed questions were also asked in subsequent interviews, 
drawing on emerging results. These concerned issues such as: 
 movement of professionals between the private and public sector 
 the market for HTA consultancies 
 the quality of HTA dossiers 
 the data availability for appraisals by the HTA Department 
We encouraged interviewees to elaborate on their points in depth to maximise the 
value of their unique expert knowledge. With seven non-responses or refusals, we 
achieved a 79 percent response rate. Non-responses were distributed evenly across 
the key stakeholder categories, with the exception of medical professionals whom 
we were unable to reach. This was presumably because of their time pressured 
working conditions or a lack of awareness of HTA operation in the healthcare 
system. 
 
Our research was approved by the Ethics Committee at the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Cambridge. All interviewees were briefed about the 
objectives of the study, the interview procedure, and our intention to analyse data 
and publish our findings. We reassured interviewees about our commitment to 
protecting their anonymity by creating broad interviewee categories. As an 
additional reassurance, we offered them the option of accepting or refusing tape 
recording. Six interviewees refused such a recording. In these cases, extensive notes 
were taken during and immediately after the interview.  
 
For each interview, detailed interview protocols in English, omitting redundant 
material clearly irrelevant to our research, were prepared by Researcher A and 
Researcher D based on recordings (where available) and extensive notes. The 
interview data were analysed by Researcher A and then discussed with Researcher 
B, C and D. Researcher E, F and G contributed to their interpretation. A thematic 
analysis (Guest et al. 2011), facilitated by NVivo 10, allowed an initial coding of the 
interviews based on concepts derived from the research questions. At a later stage, 
some codes were collapsed and code families and networks were established, to 
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best reflect the main themes emerging from the data. We present quotations 
expressing views that were shared by the interviewees representing various 
stakeholder perspectives. The interviewer’s ID number is given in square brackets. 
Since many of the interviews were recorded in Hungarian, they are paraphrased 
here in English. Where statements offered by the interviewees differ, we chose 
quotations that appeared the most appropriate in light of the entire dataset.  
 
4. Findings 
4.1 The role of the HTA Department 
Our interviewees pointed to a number of areas in which the HTA Department 
successfully fulfilled its formal role of providing evidence for reimbursement 
decisions, as set out in the legislation. Appraisals undertaken by the HTA 
department were widely viewed as independent, and conducted according to 
predefined criteria. A high-ranking NHIF official stressed, “The HTA Department (…) 
is more like an independent group of experts to support the NHIF.”[12] According to 
a former HTA Department senior official, “These [appraisal documents] have fifty-
sixty pages which is too much but it is a comprehensive description on efficiency and 
safety, health gain, and review [on] the health economic analysis, which includes the 
price of the product and the comparator. And at the end there is an opinion.”[20] A 
further strength of the HTA Department was its timeliness in conducting appraisals. 
Interviewees typically reported that the Department normally achieves the 
preparation of an evaluation within the 45 day time-window. A consultancy 
company manager highlighted, “There is no such thing as having the submission on 
hold [at the HTA Department].”[10]  
 
Nevertheless, some interviewees still saw the HTA Department’s role in supporting 
evidence-based decision-making as suboptimal. Most notably, the assessments 
provided one-off snapshots in time – the HTA Department only contributed to the 
earliest phases of the reimbursement process, with unrealised potential for 
subsequent contributions. According to a former HTA Department employee, “[HTA 
Department] has only 45 days to assess the technology. So if something changes, for 
example new evidence comes out or the price is changed, the HTA Department is not 
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involved anymore.”[15] A drug company representative also noted the absence of a 
process to revise previous decisions: “the follow-up process is missing. This is an 
important limitation of the [reimbursement] system.”[4]  
 
The interviewees conceded that there was insufficient commitment of decision-
makers to publicly disclose information on technology assessment documents that 
would justify decisions on public reimbursement. An academic explained, "if there is 
no need for justification, implicit judgment becomes the most important part [in 
decision-making]. And those consultants who got the insights on how the implicit 
judgments are made become successful.”[14] Although HTA experts, and even, 
occasionally, policymakers, publicly acknowledged the importance of transparency, 
concrete remedies were not put into practice. A senior HTA consultant explained: 
“actually in public no one is against it. The answer that people usually say is that 
they want do it [put HTA documents in the public domain] in the near future (…) but 
it just never happens.”[15] An interviewed academic was emphatic on this point, 
"Unfortunately we were not brave enough to move into a direction where we can 
operate HTA in a transparent way."[14] 
 
This institutional shortcoming could be addressed in the future, as is being 
suggested in on-going consultations about possible publication of executive 
summaries from appraisals including major questions on elements from the 
submission (e.g. comparator, cost-effectiveness ratio etc.). A member of the HTA 
Department emphasised, “I don’t want to be a part of a black box.”[17] Yet the 
proposed improvements to transparency may face opposition from some 
stakeholders, including the manufacturers. A pharmaceutical company 
representative explained that more transparency could even be risky for 
manufacturers: “If an evaluation is negative by the HTA Department and then the 
NHIF still makes a positive recommendation, it would be immediately attacked by 
competitor companies. They would use these information against each other.”[9] 
 
A related area of unrealised potential arose from the limited extent of consultations 
with key stakeholders, especially clinicians, manufacturers, and patient 
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organisations. According to a current HTA Department employee, “There is a need 
[for consultation with clinicians] and the HTA Department would like to have more 
support from external experts especially in the clinical part (…) There were no 
attempts [to formalise consultations] and also it is hard to motivate the busy 
physicians. This is not in the everyday practice.”[24] This is the situation even 
though representatives from the Colleges of Medical Professionals also give their 
opinion at the HTAC. Moreover, former HTA Department employees explained that, 
“This [consultation with clinicians] is sub-optimal. There should be a well-regulated 
process of doing this”[15] and “Key opinion leaders are not really interested in HTA. 
They have a perception of HTA that it is a bureaucratic thing, shifting papers back 
and forth.”[3] Similarly, manufacturers complained about the limited feedback on 
their submissions “A basic problem is that this process is not a consultation type 
process. There are no consultation opportunities to conduct a proper and objective 
evaluation of the submission.”[9] This issue was recognised by those conducting 
assessments; negotiations are underway to create a platform for sharing health 
economic models to facilitate two-way discussion between the HTA Department 
and manufacturers. Unlike the situation in some other countries, patient 
organisations have no formal contact with the HTA Department. A representative of 
a patient organisation explained: “In general a Hungarian patient or a Hungarian 
patient organisation never hears about HTA. They are not aware of the process in 
which the HTA Department is involved. (…) On the other hand, (…) it is not facilitated 
to invite [patient organisations] to collaborate. This is not even on the agenda.”[21]  
 
4.2. Influence of the HTA Department 
The influence of the HTA Department on reimbursement processes was widely 
viewed as limited. A former key governmental official emphasised, “The influence of 
HTA is smaller than it would be required. This is changing and there are steps 
forward but still it is smaller than required.”[25] This point was summarised, 
perhaps most vividly, by a high-ranking government official, “The HTA Department 
works as an ante-room, where people wipe off their shoes.”[19] 
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Many of our interviewees stressed that the HTA Department had limited influence 
on the NHIF. A senior consultant stressed, “there is an ambivalent relationship 
between the NHIF and the HTA Department. (…) for the NHIF the technology 
assessment is too academic and requires that everything should be perfect.”[10] A 
key issue was the narrow scope of appraisals, including only evaluations on the 
validity of data included in manufacturer submissions. According to a high-level 
governmental official, “they only review that an analysis is appropriate or not, in the 
context of the given methodology. This is too narrow a perspective.”[19] 
Contrastingly, some interviewees felt that the HTA Department should be providing 
more direct advice to decision-makers. An academic explained, “The result of this 
kind of restriction, [is] that the opinion is usually quite neutral and you can interpret 
it in different ways. (…) But they never made a strong statement like ‘the quality of 
the submission is extremely poor, extremely biased and there is no evidence on some 
point’.”[14] Some of our interviewees also mentioned opaque phrasing of 
recommendations provided by the Department that were ill- suited to real-life 
decision-making purposes. An NHIF employee noted, “It is not helpful for instance 
when they say that the cost-effectiveness is uncertain.”[12] 
 
Even more important was the lack of inclusion of a NHIF institutional perspective in 
appraisals undertaken by the HTA Department. A former NHIF employee added, 
"The main weakness is that [HTA] does not serve the interest of the payer. Because 
it does not lead to better decisions."[3] Specifically, the HTA Department does not 
prepare recommendations on whether a new technology should be reimbursed or 
not. This disjuncture of organisational perspectives could, in certain circumstances, 
lead to the by-passing of the HTA Department by the NHIF. This was particularly the 
case when the NHIF had enough knowledge about the technology, and the 
agreement with the manufacturer on price was seen as acceptable. In this case the 
NHIF saw the contribution from HTA as redundant. “Instead of a normal procedure 
it could be acceptable to have a simplified procedure,”[12] was an assertion made 
by a high-ranking NHIF employee. Consequently, it appeared that in some cases 
emerging recommendations from the HTA Department were disregarded a priori. A 
former HTA Department employee stressed, “In some cases the final decision is 
12 
 
made before the opinion [of the HTA Department] is discussed. (…) NHIF already has 
information whether the drug has a place in the therapeutic practice in Hungary or 
not.”[20]  
 
Yet another factor limiting the HTA Department’s influence on the NHIF was its 
reliance on list prices as opposed to the actual, often discounted, prices negotiated 
with drug manufacturers. While the Hungarian system relies heavily on price-
volume agreements between the manufacturer and the NHIF, the HTA Department 
is not provided access to the details of any negotiations taking place in parallel to its 
appraisal process. An NHIF employee explained, “There is an information 
asymmetry between the HTA Department and the national payer [NHIF]. This is the 
result of the confidential prices which are set through national tendering or 
negotiation process in case of innovative products.”[12] The HTA Department has no 
information regarding the state of negotiations on actual prices. According to a 
representative of a drug company, “From this point on the whole HTA system worth 
nothing. Manufacturers submit analyses which have completely wrong input data as 
price.”[6] Similarly, a former HTA Department employee reacted to this situation by 
saying, "Basically sometimes you are just comparing two numbers that have nothing 
to do with reality. Of course nobody cares what the result of the comparison is, 
because it is nonsense."[15] 
 
The HTA Department had even less influence on decision-makers in ministries. A 
former NHIF employee saw the HTA Department’s impact as negligible. “Generally, 
the government decisions are so centralised and so hierarchical that the information 
[from the HTA Department] is not valuable in terms of [evidence-based] decision-
making.”[3] Other interviewees pointed out that the influence of the HTA 
Department was constrained by political considerations that top-level decision-
makers were sometimes inclined to prioritise over HTA. A former NHIF official 
elaborated, “the final decision is made by politically influenced stakeholders who 
absolutely do not understand this way of analysing drugs. There is a gap and this 
gap is quite huge. (...) There is a need for a stronger relationship between HTA and 
decisions.”[16] Reimbursement procedures and the related timeline of decisions are 
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only transparent until a certain point. Once ministerial bodies (e.g. state secretary 
of health or Ministry of Finance) got involved very frequently their opinions drove 
decisions and delayed announcements on reimbursement status. “Timelines are not 
transparent in the governmental sector. The fact that the Ministry of Finance has 
such a significant influence on the reimbursement of health technologies blocks 
constantly the planned timelines and the deadlines that should be maintained 
throughout the entire reimbursement decision-making process.”[8] 
 
In addition to factors constraining the HTA’s influence in relation to the NHIF and 
the Ministry of Health, the influence of the HTA department was undermined by 
problems pertaining to its organisational capacity. A NHIF official stressed, “The HTA 
Department currently does not have the capacity to become a prominent body in the 
technology assessment.”[13] There are approximately 80-100 submissions on 
pharmaceuticals and a similar number on medical devices per year. There are 13-15 
permanent employees who work on evaluating the submissions and representing 
the HTA body in committees. The impact of these organisational constraints was 
exacerbated by the tight timelines imposed by the reimbursement legislation. A 
former HTA Department employee stated: “The 43 days for evaluation (…) does not 
make sense.”[23] A former senior officer at HTA Department explained that the 
time-window also includes holidays, and therefore it “actually becomes 30 days of 
evaluation that is done by one health economist and one medical expert, who have 
more submissions in parallel.”[20] 
 
Human resource considerations were even more critical because of revolving door 
between the HTA Department and manufacturers and consultancies. A former HTA 
Department employee explained, “the biggest barrier of the development [of the 
Department] is the high fluctuation. (…) The entire staff (…) changed in the last 3.5 
years. There is no continuity at the institution.”[23] A key factor in this brain drain 
from the HTA Department was the low level of remuneration given the high level of 
skills and expertise of its employees. A consultancy employee pointed out the usual 
career path of young health economists: “people start their career at the public 
sector, work there for four-five years and then go to manufacturers or 
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consultancies.”[15] A NHIF employee described this process as “unfortunately the 
HTA Department works as a spring board for young people.”[13] 
Yet low salaries were only one reason for the outflow of highly qualified personnel. 
Many interviewees stressed that the limited influence on the reimbursement 
system can also contribute to decisions to move to the private sector. As a former 
NHIF employee pointed out, “they [HTA Department employees] also understand 
that it is not only about money, but what they do is essentially without impact on 
the final decision. It results a huge frustration.”[3] A former HTA Department 
employee criticised the system as “You are in a job where you compare two 
numbers and nobody cares about it.”[15]  
 
Finally, there was also evidence of a vicious cycle whereby the HTA Department’s 
limited impact on the reimbursement process encouraged actions by other 
stakeholders that further diminished its influence. This was perhaps best illustrated 
by the persistent low quality of manufacturers’ HTA submissions. A HTA department 
employee explained that “people who worked in the HTA Department now work for 
pharma. They saw no impact, so they don’t want to create a normal dossier.”[17] 
Similarly, a former NHIF employee noted that "If someone would take the real 
decisions based on HTA submissions [by manufacturers], then the HTA submissions 
would have been revised and rethought years before. At the level of real decisions, 
[the decision-makers] are not interested in the HTA submission. That is why the HTA 
submissions are not for decision-making but for themselves."[16] However, there 
were other reasons behind the low quality of submissions, including limited data 
availability. As a representative of academia emphasised, “Source of valid 
information is an important challenge for the HTA submission. Manufacturers, 
consultants and the governmental sector including the HTA Department do not 
necessarily use the same source for data.”[8]  
 
4.3 Perceived costs and benefits of the HTA system  
Although the HTA Department has limited perceived influence on the 
reimbursement process, it still provided many important benefits. Given the lack of 
available data from HTA dossiers, appraisal documents by the HTA Department, or 
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price negotiation contracts between the NHIF and manufacturers, it is not currently 
possible to express these benefits in monetary terms. Nevertheless, it was clear that 
the HTA Department was seen as creating many important intangible benefits for 
the Hungarian health policy in the long-run. These spillover benefits were most 
commonly associated with developing experience in applying HTA principles in 
policymaking, including awareness of their practical advantages and disadvantages. 
A senior manufacturer employee maintained, “There was “hurrah-optimism” at the 
beginning [HTA implementation in Hungary], but this is over. We realised how and 
what can be used from an HTA system. And we also know what the HTA system is 
not useable for.”[6] Consequently, even senior NHIF officials ignored some of the 
recommendations coming from the HTA Department but they still relied on the 
principles of HTA in developing health policy. Ministerial policymakers tended to be 
even more strategic in this regard, showcasing HTA as a key achievement in building 
an evidence-based policymaking infrastructure. A former high-ranking NHIF 
employee emphasised, "We can tell the world that we have a good HTA 
system."[16] 
A key specific benefit achieved by the HTA Department was the institutionalisation 
of explicit criteria for evaluating health technologies. A HTA consultant explained, 
“It is good that there is a platform to consider cost-effectiveness.”[10] A former key 
HTA Department official stressed, “at least someone sits down at some point, thinks 
about, reads and evaluates the report about the technology. And this is forwarded 
to the decision-makers.”[20] This was associated with curtailing informal influence 
wielded by economically powerful players such as drug companies. A former high-
level governmental official recalled, “Before the establishment of HTA system there 
was a “free-robbery” by companies. Before [the introduction of HTA in] 2004, 
pharma companies did whatever they wanted.”[1] This has changed dramatically 
thanks to the operation of the HTA Department and the requirement to submit HTA 
dossiers. An academic reported, “It is very rare that someone wants to receive 
reimbursement based only on lobbying.”[8] 
 
Last but not least, the HTA Department underpinned a broader HTA system, 
including a range of educational activities unparalleled in the CEE region. As an 
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academic expounded, “We have a HTA agency and many trained HTA experts in 
Hungary, which is unique in the region. There is an opportunity to study [HTA] in a 
post-graduate program without leaving the country.”[14] In particular, the HTA 
Department was a key element of the infrastructure allowing for participation in 
international collaborations. A former HTA Department official stressed, “the 
Department was successful in joining to international programs and teams. This 
results in more experience.”[20] 
 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the HTA system in its current form, our 
interviewees also pointed out its costs. Overall, public resources spent on the 
Hungarian HTA system are considered to be negligible and the direct costs of the 
HTA system are mainly borne by manufacturers. From the manufacturer’s 
perspective, a key cost associated with the current form of the appraisal process led 
by the HTA Department is the administrative fee for each reimbursement 
submission, amounting to 1,500,000 HUF (approximately €5,000) per 
reimbursement application for pharmaceuticals, and 700,000 HUF (approximately 
€2,300) for simple medical devices.  
 
Estimating the public costs associated with running the HTA Department proves 
more difficult. First, administrative fees levied on drug companies are shared 
between the NHIF and the HTA Department, based on an agreement whose details 
are not publicly disclosed. According to a senior NHIF employee, “[the share from 
the fee] is based on a contract between the organisations. So there is no need for 
case-by-case negotiation.”[12] It is estimated that the HTA Department receives 80 
percent of the fee for pharmaceuticals and 30 percent of the fee for simple medical 
devices. The HTA Department also has some external funding, for instance grants 
from the European network for Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA). The 
HTA Department’s annual budget then according to these estimates should be 
between €400,000 and €450,000. However, since the operational costs of the 
Department are not separated from the cost of the NIPN, to which the HTA 
Department belongs, it is not clear whether the revenue generated from 
17 
 
administrative fees plus income from externally funded projects is sufficient to 
cover its running costs.  
 
An additional cost, from the manufacturers’ perspective, is incurred by having to 
develop HTA submissions, a task commonly outsourced to external consultancy 
companies. While the prices of developing submissions are not publicly available, 
the average price mentioned by most interviewees was around €10,000, with the 
lowest limit of about €4,000. According to a manufacturing company’s 
representative, referring to a general submission, “For this cost they [consultants] 
collect the input data for the [health economic] model. (…) Then they evaluate the 
results, make the sensitivity analysis and prepare all the required appendix or 
attachments.”[9] New health economic models for economic evaluation are rarely 
developed for Hungarian submissions; in most cases global models are adopted to 
the Hungarian context. Prices of consultancies may increase if a new model needs 
to be developed, local data collection from primary sources is required, or if 
consultations with experts or additional studies such as systematic reviews are 
needed. In such cases, a very complex submission is typically priced at around 
€35,000 – €45,000.  
 
Estimating the total annual cost of developing HTA submissions by the 
pharmaceutical industry is challenging. A reasonably reliable method considers 
official yearly revenues of 3-4 major consultancies that focus on developing HTA 
submissions. There are also a handful of smaller companies with negligible annual 
revenue compared to the size of the consultancy market. Calculated this way, the 
consultancy market can be estimated to be around €3,000,000 – €3,500,000. While 
this figure is likely to overestimate the market size (the consultancy firms may still 
provide other services not related to HTA), it was recognised as a reasonable 
estimate by a number of interviewees familiar with the sector.  
 
As the perceived benefits of the HTA system were intangible and its costs were 
difficult to estimate, some interviewees maintained that public and private money 
spent on the system did not represent good value. This was evident given the low 
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adherence of decision-makers to HTA recommendations. A high level government 
official explained, “Currently the importance and the role of the technology 
assessment disappears quickly from the system. So we could say that funds spent on 
this process are wasted money.”[19] A former NHIF employee criticised the system 
by saying that early developments should not be the only perceived values 
anymore: "HTA moved the system from pre-historic stage to (...) an Anno Domini 
stage. But that it is. And how long can you be grateful to this?"[3] 
 
Some interviewees noted that, even if manufacturers have to bear administrative 
costs and the costs of consultancies, the most important beneficiary is still the 
private rather than the public sector. Other interviewees pointed out that this 
system has only one clear winner, the consultancy sector. A representative of a 
consultant company pointed out that “benefits are there for all the consultants who 
are doing the [HTA] dossier[s].”[16] 
 
Yet the perceived balance of costs and benefits could be altered by very recent 
policy changes, including a formal review of the methodological guideline for 
economic evaluation to better reflect the needs of the decision-maker, improve the 
skills of HTA Department workers in the validation of health economic models, build 
an international network and initiate direct communication to manufacturers. A 
former HTA Department employee explained, "It is not the worst system in the 
world. But it would be so easy to improve it. (…) We just need to write a few 
additional legal texts here and there, and we would have a much more efficient and 
transparent system."[15]  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our findings show that even if an HTA body fulfills its intended formal role of 
supporting evidence-based policymaking, it may face major institutional constraints. 
Based on the Hungarian case, its contributions to the pricing and reimbursement 
process can, for example be limited to its earliest phases, without considering 
subsequent contributions (e.g. involvement in pricing negotiations or revision 
procedures). We also found that the perceived influence of an HTA body on the 
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reimbursement process may be limited, indicated by its inferior position in 
relationships with payers and health policymakers. Despite calls for increased 
openness of HTA as one of the founding principles of the field, in practice HTA can 
be associated with limited transparency and insufficient consultation with experts, 
manufacturers and patient organisations. Similar results were found in a recent 
overview on the HTA implementation in Hungary (Németh et al., 2017). This raises 
obvious normative concerns and may, as in Hungary, contribute to a further 
diminishing of the HTA body’s role in pricing and reimbursement decision-making.  
 
Our findings from the Hungarian case also suggest that an HTA body may have a 
positive impact on the development of a broader HTA system in a country, by laying 
the foundational infrastructure of evidence-based policymaking in healthcare and 
promoting an understanding of internationally accepted HTA principles (Voko et al. 
2016). While costs and benefits of the Hungarian HTA system were difficult to 
quantify, there was strong scepticism as to whether it represented “good value for 
money”. It is quite unusual that none of our interviewees mentioned financial or 
health benefits of the HTA system, as the benefits of HTA are typically thought of in 
monetary terms or savings and a more rational use of resources. A reason for this 
can be the methodological challenge of estimating the benefits of HTA for 
populations or health systems (Löblová, 2017). Some attempts have been made 
previously (Zechmeister and Schumacher 2012; Schumacher and Zechmeister 2013; 
Jacob and McGregor 1997). However, these studies relied mainly on published HTA 
reports and other related documents that were not available in our case. Yet more 
plausibly, we can attribute this non-finding to the lack of influence the Hungarian 
HTA Department has on eventual reimbursement decisions. 
 
More fundamentally, despite the shared diagnosis of the major drawbacks of the 
HTA process, including the lack of access to actual prices, lack of transparency or 
capacity limitations at the HTA Department, none of the major stakeholders 
seemed to have a sufficient interest in initiating substantive reforms. To begin with, 
consulting companies have a stable and predictable market where competition is 
low due to the small number of established companies. Manufacturers’ submissions 
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for HTA evaluation create the basis for their business operations and their service 
portfolio can be diversified with HTA-related activities. Their human resource 
capacity is ensured by the education system and by the underpaid but experienced 
governmental officers from the HTA Department or from the NHIF. Manufacturers, 
on the other hand, seemed to have considered HTA as a tick-the-box exercise and 
therefore were willing to bear the associated costs, which seems to be minor from 
their perspective. These costs are predictable and rely heavily on consulting 
companies. Manufacturers understand that relevant questions of reimbursement 
are not discussed at the level of the HTA Department, but rather at the NHIF 
through price negotiations, or at a higher, health policy level, which is neither 
transparent nor predictable. Moving on to the national payer although it considered 
the opinion of HTA Department, it did not fully utilise the HTA submissions and the 
related appraisals in its decision-making. The NHIF has a monopolistic position 
during price negotiation with manufacturers. This gives it great bargaining power 
and it is not willing to share any information with other parties. Although the 
concept of HTA is accepted by the NHIF, there is no intention to utilise HTA to take 
account of changing circumstances, such as new evidence on effectiveness or costs. 
Further, HTA as a policy practice was poorly understood, which could be a key 
reason for a lack of concrete proposals to increase transparency or strengthen the 
evidence base for decisions.  Finally, the voice of the academic sector was 
constrained by its limited involvement in compiling HTA dossiers, and patient 
organisations played no role in the HTA process. 
 
On balance, our findings suggest that the HTA Department was the only stakeholder 
with an interest in realising the potential of the Hungarian HTA system. This echoes 
similar findings from other CEE countries by AUTHOR (Author forthcoming). Recent 
initiatives by the Department, such as renewing its methodological guidelines or 
increasing international collaboration through EUnetHTA were noted by other 
stakeholders. However, limited staffing, a substantial brain drain on the industry, 
time-pressure on submissions and huge workloads are significant barriers to 
achieving a stronger role in the reimbursement process. The current organisational 
structure, with the Department embedded in the NIPN, responsible for regulatory 
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affairs, provides many opportunities for the HTA Department to achieve greater 
prominence. This could mirror a similar partnership between the European 
Medicines Agency and EUnetHTA at the EU level (Berntgen et al. 2014). 
 
From a regional perspective, HTA in Hungary can be compared with that of Poland. 
The organisational and legal framework of the Polish Agency for Health Technology 
Assessment (AHTAPol) were also established after joining the EU, in 2004. The 
political significance of AHTAPol recommendations in the reimbursement process 
was reported to be important and their support is vital for legitimising 
reimbursement decisions (Ozieranski et al. 2012a; Ozieranski and King, 2016). HTA 
recommendations are publicly available from AHTAPol’s website, and therefore HTA 
activities can be monitored and compared to reimbursement decisions to gain more 
understanding on potential influence of AHTAPol (Bochenek et al., 2017; Kolasa et 
al. 2011b). Further, the availability of HTA assessment reports, albeit frequently 
heavily redacted, makes it possible to investigate the role of various considerations 
(e.g. recommendations of other HTA bodies) in the recommendation by AHTAPol 
(Kolasa et al. 2011a). Similar studies would be highly welcomed in Hungary but the 
lack of relevant publicly available data makes them impossible. In addition, the 
public availability of HTA recommendations would make it possible to quantify their 
impact on subsequent reimbursement decisions, as has been done in Poland 
recently (Kawalec and Malinowski 2016). Notably, these new findings point to a 
lower policy impact than suggested by assessments made by stakeholders 
(Ozieranski et al. 2012a; Ozieranski et al. 2012b). Another similarity between the 
two countries was the extensive movement of staff from HTA bodies to private 
sector firms (Ozieranski and King, 2017. Forthcoming). 
 
While many of our findings are specific to the Hungarian context, there are others 
from which lessons can be extrapolated across jurisdictions especially for those that 
are currently implementing or reforming their own HTA systems. A recent 
stakeholder analysis from Chile, for instance, revealed that Chilean stakeholders are 
aware of many potential shortcomings of an HTA body although there is a 
consensus on the need for such a body (Lavín et al. 2017). In particular, they are 
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concerned about the danger of creating an HTA body without meaningful impact on 
policy. As the Hungarian example shows, this can happen because of bureaucratic 
turf wars between institutions, understaffing, or brain drain to the private sector. 
Our findings are also relevant to those countries where capacity building is seen as a 
crucial step in improving their HTA systems such as Croatia, Greece, Slovenia (Huic 
et al. 2017; Kani et al. 2017; Rupel, 2017). Without downplaying the efforts to 
increase human capacities, the Hungarian case suggests that creating large numbers 
of HTA experts may not be sufficient to build effective HTA institutions if these 
experts are drawn into the private sector after gaining experience. This means that 
countries with less competitive public sector salaries should pay attention to 
retention of staff in addition to recruitment and training.  The Hungarian example 
also highlights the risk, also affecting some high-income countries, of creating a 
powerless institution which will, ten years later, face a reform stalemate and act as 
a tick-the-box bureaucratic exercise while stakeholders accept its costs without 
utilising its outputs. Finally, our observed benefits of training substantial numbers of 
HTA experts and promoting the culture of evidence-based policymaking are also 
likely to be replicated in other countries, and should be considered by countries 
considering HTA.  
 
Two key weaknesses of our study must be mentioned. First, as suggested above, 
given the non-existence of publicly available documents on HTA and our lack of 
access to internal documents, we were unable to corroborate our qualitative data 
with primary sources (such as manufacturers’ submissions or appraisal reports by 
the HTA Department, as well as their impact on final reimbursement decisions).  
Ideally, if documents related to HTA become publicly available, we would be able to 
triangulate some of our findings. This would most importantly involve comparing 
the HTA Department’s opinions with reimbursement decisions at NHIF or at the 
ministerial level. In the absence of documentary data, we triangulated information 
by verifying it with multiple stakeholder groups. Second, since we were unable to 
reach representatives of clinicians, their perspective on the Hungarian HTA system 
was inferred by those interviewees who had experience collaborating with them. A 
key policy implication arising from these findings is that the Hungarian HTA system 
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must review whether the reimbursement process requires strengthening the formal 
role of the HTA Department. We believe that studies on manufacturers’ 
submissions and appraisal reports by the HTA Department are vital to answering 
this question. A first step towards a comprehensive review of the Hungarian HTA 
system depends on policymakers, as it involves increasing the transparency of the 
process.  
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Table 1. Categories of interviewees 
Organisation 
Number of 
completed 
interviews 
Refusals 
and non-
responses 
Total 
approached 
Public sector 
HTA Department and National 
Institute of Pharmacy and Nutrition 
4 1 5 
Ministry responsible for health 3  3 
National Health Insurance Fund 3 2 5 
Academia 3  3 
Private sector 
Manufacturers 5 1 6 
Consulting companies 5 1 6 
Non-governmental organisations 
Patient organisations 3 0 3 
Colleges of Medical Professionals 0 2 2 
Total 26 7 33 
 
